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INTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNI1Y AND INSURANCE
"FAMILY MEMBER EXCLUSIONS": SHARED
ASSUMPTIONS, RELATIONAL AND LIBERAL
FEMINIST CHALLENGES
Jennifer Wriggins*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The conference in connection with which this paper is submitted,
"Feminist Theories of Relation 'In the Shadow of the Law,"' is a wel
come occasion to reflect upon the relational in law, and on relational
feminism as it relates to law. 1 Torts and insurance deal with family and
other relationships, sometimes in ways that are straightforward and
obvious, and sometimes in ways that are subtle but real. These ways
deserve more examination than they have yet received. Although torts
and insurance are often considered separately, they can not be under
stood in isolation from one another. 2
A purpose of this paper is to begin such an examination in the
context of domestic violence, interspousal tort immunity, and liability
insurance in the United States. A further purpose iS to examine how
two different feminist theories, liberal feminism and relational femi
nism, would respond to the current situation regarding these is
sues-the current situation being, as I will argue,· the persistence of de
facto interspousal tort immunity through the mechanism of private
insurance.

* Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law. Thanks to Dennis Car
rillo for outstanding research assistance and to Dean Colleen Khoury for providing
research funding.
1. "Relational feminism" has been described by· Mary Becker in Patriarchy and
Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEcAL F. 21 as contrasted with
formal equality and dominance feminism in numerous respects, including that it is
based on different values from the other theories and has a different focus from other
theories. See id at 46. Becker claims that the values of relational feminism are "com
munity (and) relationships, and traditionally feminine qualities should be valued
more and traditionally male qualities should be valued less." By contrast, formal
equality treats as core values the ideas of individual autonomy and choice, and domi
nance feminism treats "power as defined today" as a dominant value. Jd. Robin
West's book, CAroNe FOR JusTICE (1997) can be seen as an extended argument for
relational feminism.
2. See generally, MARsHALLS. SHAPo, ToRT AND iNJURY LAw 166 (2d ed. 2000);
Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113, 1114 (1990); Tom Baker,
&considering Insurance fO'T Punitive Damages, 1998 W1s. L REv. 101, 120.
251
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T HE PERSISTENCE OF DE FACTO lNTERSPOUSAL TORT IMMUNITY

Common law interspousal tort immunity was a foundational as
pect of tort and family law until quite recently. The justifications for it
have changed over time. An early justification for it was the now-dis
credited doctrine of marital unity, according to which husband and
wife were deemed one person and therefore could not sue each
other. 3 One of the recent justifications for immunity was the assump
tion that spouses, particularly in the negligence context, would col
Jude to create false daims and obtain undeserved insurance benefits. 4
Although it is difficult to make definitive empirical claims about his
torical domestic violence patterns, it seems that interspousal tort im
munity largely protected men from women's claims rather than vice
versa.5 Although some erosion of the doctrine occurred during the
early twentieth century, its near-complete demise occurred in the last
third of the twentieth century. 6 During the time period when inter
spousal tort immunity was in effect, the tort system of course provided
neither deterrence of nor compensation for interspousal injury.
However, de facto interspousal tort immunity persists in the form
of insurance exdusions. Insurance companies for decades have in
cluded "family member exclusions" in homeowner and automobile li
ability policies.7 These exclusions provide that family members can
not make claims against the policy. If a wife is injured by her husband,
and the wife sues the husband for the injury, the liability policy will
not cover the husband for the claim. 8 The injured wife in this exam
ple has a choice of bringing a claim against her husband where there
is no insurance coverage, and not bringing a claim at all. These provi
sions are ubiquitous in homeowners liability policies and were wide
spread in automobile policies until fairly recently. 9 The reason for the
exclusions is the same as the recent justifications for interspousal tort
immunity mentioned above; the aim is to protect against collusive
suits. 1 Court decisions in both homeowners and automobile contexts
have struck some of these exclusions down as against public policy,

°

3. Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tart Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. Rt:v. 359, 363
(1989).
4. !d. a t nn.457-503 and accompanying text.
5. Su geruraUy, Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Ltroen: Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 VAL£ LJ. 2117 (1996).
6. Tobias, supra note 3; Carl Tobias, The Imminent Demise ofInterspou.sal Tart Immu
nily, 60 Mo NT. L. Rt:v. 101 (1999).
7. R OBERT E. KEITON & ALAN L WtDJSS, INSURANCE LAw 393 § 4.9 (c)(1)(1988) .
8. Of course the same is true if a wife injures a husband.
9. The exclusion applies to claims against "family members," so it in effect insu
Lates parents from children 's claims and vice versa. Parent-child immunity is beyond
the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987); Frye v.
Frye, 505 A.2d 826 (Md. 1986); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992); Squeglia
V. Squeglia, 661 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1995); REsTATEMENT (2o) OF T O RTS § 895G (1977).
10. KEETON & W101SS, supra note 7, at 393 § 4.9(c)(l)(family member autom<r
bile exclusions "designed with a view to protecting insurers from collusive suits") .
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particularly in the automobile context. 11 An additional common in
surance provision, the "intentional acts exclusion," also bars claims for
some intentional torts between spouses. 12
These insurance exclusions have a similar effect to common law
interspousal tort immunity. They inhibit and discourage litigation
seeking redress for tortiouS injury. If a person is injured by a spouse's
tort and consults a lawyer, the lawyer will analyze not just liability is
sues but also the practical issues of what damages actually can be re
covered.13 The potential defendant's liability insurance generally is
the most important potential source ofrecovery.l'' Family member ex
clusions and intentional act exclusions in individual liability policies
guarantee that lawsuits will only rarely be filed for interspousal in
jury.l5 For various reasons including these exclusions, there is very
little ton litigation seeking redress for these injuries. 1 6 Despite tort
compensation for myriad other harms, both physical and psychic,
compensation is simply lacking in the area of injury from domestic
violence. 17 As in the era of interspousal tort immunity, the tort system
thus is still providing virtually no deterrence or compensation.
11. Su, e.g., Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co, 689 P.2d 585 (Colo. ·1985)
(recognizing possibility of fraud and collusion between family members but holding
that public policy in favor of insurance and compensation for those injured in auto
mobile accidents rendered family member exclusion invalid), rtSUil overturned fry kgis
lation, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Feghali, 814 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1991) (acknowledging
legislative change); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985) (despite
possibility of household collusion, policy of protecting victims of automobile acci
dents outweighs importance of protecting insurers from possible collusion). See also
Shannon v. Shannon, 442 N.W.2d 25, 35 (Wis. 1989) (upholding family member ex
clusion in homeowners policy in view of likely bias of family members). See generaJ.ly,
joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, 48 SMU L. REv. 1225 (May-June
1995) (noting that while intrafamily immunity was the law of torts, family member
exclusions in insurance policies were consistent with the law of torts but that when
immunity was abolished, policy exclusion contradicted tort policy); Martin .J . McMa
hon, Annotation: Validity, Under Insurance Statutes, of Coverage Exclusion fw Injury to w
Death of Insured's Family w Household Members, 52 A.L.R. 4th 18 (1987).
12. Detailed discussion of the intentional acts exclusion is found in jennifer
Wriggins, Domestic Violence Tarts, 75 S. CAL. L.. REv.' 121, 135-36, 161-65 (2001).
13. See Michael J . Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behaviur of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1190 (1992) ("[L]awyers usu
ally do not accept a case unless they see an acceptable probability of economic success
for themselves in doing so").
14. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, a11d the Mwal Economy of Tort Law in
Action. 35 LAw & Soc'v REv. 275 (2002).
15. Douglas D. Scherer, Tort ~dUsfw Victims ofDomestic Violence, 43 S.C. L REv.
543, 565 (1992). Scherer found a minuscule number of court decisions dealt with
domestic violence injuries. It appears that more recent studies of the number of law
suits filed or decided specifically for domestic violence injuries have not been pub
lished. Set generally Wriggins, supra note 12, at 13~36.
16. For further discussion, see Wriggins, supra note 12, at 135-44.
17. wFirst party" insurance such as health insurance or disability insurance
(which is uncommon) may cover meclical bills or some lost wages, but this is very
different from ton compensation. Tort compensation can include pain and suffer
ing, lost wages, mental distress damages and punitive damages in appropriate cases.
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Interspousal immunity has reappeared in a new guise - the guise
of private insurance. The archaic mechanism for protecting actors
who cause harm within families has been replaced by a new, more
subtle mechanism. That mechanism is private liability insurance con~
tracts which exclude coverage for intentional torts between family
members.
The new mechanism, liability insurance, is significant. Liability in
surance operates through contracts purchased by individuals and
couples from private insurance companies. Some might argue that un
like blanket common-law immunity, these liability insurance · exclu
sions reflect market demand and, as such, are not subject to the same
criticisms as the common law rule. 18 If the exclusions simply reflect
individual choice, there is no valid basis to critique them, according to
some. However, it is debatable whether insurance markets simply re
flect consumer demand; moreover, problems such as imperfect infor
mation plague such markets. 19 People · are not very good risk
estimators, as much research has shown, and may tend to make subop
timal insurance decisions. Thu's, arguments that markets reflect con
sumer demand and consumer demand reflects rational decision
making are weak in the insurance context. Moreover, insurance is not
accurately referred to as "private." Insurance is heavily regulated by
the states, although state regulators are often very influenced by the
insurance industry. 20 Insurance contracts are far from individually
bargained-for contracts. Automobile insurance is mandatory in almost
every state, and homeowners insurance is required as a condition for
getting a mortgage. 21
18. Arguments along these lines. are commonly made in support of existing in
surance arrangements. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Mod
ern Tort lAw, 96 YALE LJ. 1521, 1547 (1987) (arguing that insurance markets reflect
consumer demand and tort law does not) .
19. For an example of how imperfect information would affect insurance mar
kets, consider research showing that one hundred percent of individuals getting mar
ried believe their marriages will endure. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When
Every &lationship i.r Above Average: Perceptions and ExpectatUm.s of Divl1Tce at the Time of
Marriage, 17 LAw & HuM. B£HAV. 439, 443 (1993). Rational insurance purchase deci
sions can not be expected in every context. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein,
Richard Thaler, A Behavil1TaL Approach to Law and Economics, 10 STAN. L. R£v. 1471
(1998) (people inaccurately estimate environmental risks); Steve n D. Croley &Jon D.
Hanson, The Nrmpecv.niary Costs ofAcciderns: Pain and Suffering Damages in Tort lAw, 108
HAAv. L. R£v. 1785, 1835-1865 (individuals do not possess sufficient information to
enter into specific contracts for pain-and-suffering damages) (1995); Ellen S. Pryor,
The Tort lAw Debate, E.ffi.cUncy, and the Kingdom ofthe Ill: A Critique ofthe Insurance Theory
of Dnnpen.satiun, 79 VA. L. REv. 91 , 114, 143 (1993) (individuals may inaccurately esti
mate risk of becoming disabled); Wriggins, supra note 12.
20. See generally KENNETH ABRAHAM , DJSTRJBUTJNC RisK, 36-41 (1986).
21. Tom Baker & Karen McElrath, Whose Safety Not, Home Insurance and Inequality,
21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 229, 24243 (1990) (noting that insurance must be purchased
in order for a buyer to obtain financing for a home); Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Ml1Tal
Haz.ard: Insurance as Ml1Tal Opportunity, 6 Conn. Ins. L.S. 11, 28 (1999-2000) (noting
that most states require car owners to carry liability insurance) .
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State legislation mandates specific provisions of insurance con
tracts and specific insurance markets. Thus, the state, through insur
ance regulation, maintains an active role in the de facto persistence of
interspousal immunity.
111.

FEMINIST APPROACHES

The prevalence of injury from domestic violence and the lack of
compe,nsation for injuries from domestic violence would probably be
recognized by feminists across a wide spectrum as an example of law's
failure. Domestic violence injuries are to some extent a "gender-spe
cific harm."22 Mter all, in the United States, "domestic violence is the
most common cause of nonfatal injury to women." 28 Interspousal im
munity was, and insurance family member exclusions are, ways that
law "legitimates gender-specific harrns."24 The striking contrast be
tween widespread injury and lack of recognition or compensation
seems to present a poweiful. example of law devaluing injuries to wo
men.25 This' section explores ways of analyzing family member exclu
sions from a liberal feminist point of view and from a relational
feminist point of view. 26 Liberal feminism provides a coherent way to
critique these exclusions. A relational feminist approach also presents
a way to criticize the exclusions, but it ~ay risk justifying what it aims
to attack. However, it provides a more far-reaching way of approach
ing the problem than does the liberal feminist approach.
A liberal feminist critique of family member exclusions in insur
ance might go as follows. First, a liberal feminist perspective might
consider the problem of the persistence of de facto interpousal tort
immunity as important because family member and other exclusions
operate to "underdeter and undercompensate" harms particularly suf
fered by women.27 Although liberal feminism takes the principle of
22. See, e.g.,

98 (1997). See generally, ELIZABETH
(2000).
23. Demetrios N. Kyriacous et al., Risk Factor.f of Injury to Women from Dumestic
Violence, 23 NEw ENC. J. Mw. No. 25, Dec. 16, 1999, at 1892.
24. WEST, supra note 22, at 98.
25. Td. at 165. West notes "gender-specific hanns are underdeterred,
and. ..women are undercompensated for their sufferance." /d. at 98.
26. It should be noted that the contours of liberal and relational feminism are
not always evident. For example, there is debate about the extent to which Robin
West's ideas are acrually liberal, See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, The Liberal Future ofRela
tional Feminism: Robin West's Caring for justice, 24 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 477 (Spring
1999) . Moreover, the degree to which liberalism is actually based on the model of an
atomistic individual is disputed. See Linda C. McClain, MAtrnnistic Man Revisited": Liber
alism, Connection, and Feminist jurisfm.uknce, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171 (1992). In this
paper, I will not fully join the debate but will accept for present purposes the common
characterization ofliberalism as valuing individualism and autonomy over community
and relationship. At the same time, the characterization of liberal feminism by West
does at times seem unduly narrow, as noted at infra note 27.
27. Se~: WF.ST, supra note 22, at 98. I am assuming that under a liberal feminist
analysis, the fact that these provisions do not explicitly discriminate against women
M.

ROBIN WF.ST, CAJuNc FORjUSTIC£

SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKINC
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individual autonomy as foundational, when harms are focused on par
ticular groups, those harms become of particular concern.
Further, such a critique would take the position that people actu
ally are individuals and it should be assumed that they will act as such.
To assume that they would collude and defraud insurance companies
with other family members, much more than they would with non
family members, is a stereotype and thus mistaken. Therefore, the
same insurance rules should be applied to claims made by one family
member against another as to claims made by a stranger against a
family member. 28 This is indeed what some courts have claimed in
striking down family member exclusions in the automobile context.
As the Texas Supreme Court wrote in doing so, "[w)e refuse to in
dulge in the assumption that close relatives will prevaricate so as to
promote a spurious lawsuit. ..Dishonest individuals will always attempt
to circumvent the intent of the statute by lying, while honest citizens
are penalized when the truth brings them within the statutory
scope...."29 The assumption that relatives will prevaricate, one might
claim, is simply based on stereotyping about collusion within families.
Stereotyping is one of the enemies of liberal feminism. The exclu
sions, since simply based on stereotypes, should be abolished. If that
happens, there are likely to be many consequences. Among them are
more litigation, more compensation, and more deterrence.
A relational feminist perspective, articulated by Mary Becker8°
and Robin West,31 takes a dfferent approach. Relational feminism re
jects the "liberal" notion of rational, atomistic, self-interest-maximiz
does not mean that they are unproblematic. See generaUy, McClain, supra note 26.
Under even a liberal feminist analysis, the fact that these provisions in operation work
to women's disadvantage is problematic. West seems to claim that liberal feminism
sees gender problems only as straightforward discrimination, which as she correctly
points out is an unduly narrow way to view women's situation. WEST, supra note 22, at
153. However, the concept of discrimination adopted by liberal feminism could be
broad enough to include 'indirect' discrimination such as that effected by provisions
like the family member exclusion. See generaUy McClain, supra note 26.
28. A relatep point is that insurance family member exclusions provide a priVjite,
yet state-endorsed, way of defining family. For example, State Farm's standard home·
owner's policy defines the "insured" as "you, and if residents of your household, (a)
your relatives and (b) any other person under 21 who is in the care of any person
described above.M State Farm Homeowners Policy, FP7955 (8196), 1. It excludes cov
erage for "bodily injury to you or any insured within the meaning of pan (a) or (b) of
the definition of the insured." ld. at 17. The policy contains no definition of 'rela
tives.' Presumably a member of an unmarried heterosexual couple could claim not to
be a relative and the family member exclusion would not apply. It is interesting that
although the definition of 'family' is very much in flux in U.S. society, insurance poli
cies seem to assume that the concept is so clear that it need not even be defined.
29. Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W:2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985); Shearer v. Shearer,
480 N.E.2d 388, 393 (Ohio' l985) (spouses are no more likely to defraud auto insur
ance companies than are unrelated parties in car accident situations where a driver
wants to provide compensation to an injured passenger).
30. Becker, supra note 1.
31. WEST, supra note 22.
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ing individuals for many reasons, including that women so often do
not act that way and are harmed in the process. s2 According to Mary
Becker's chart of values of different kinds of feminism, the values and
goals of relational feminism are that "community, relationships, and
traditionally feminine qualities should be valued more and tradition
ally male qualities should be valued Jess."3 S It is difficult to apply these
values with specificity to the world of torts and insurance. If inter
spousal intentional torts have been committed, relationships by defini
tion (at a minimum) have destructive aspectss 4 and the community of
the family3 5 necessarily has been undermined. The questions of what
"relationships" and "community" we should value in such contexts,
and how we should value these things, are challenging.
A relational feminist perspective presents a broad critique, which
arguably may conflict with the idea of private insurance itself. If we
had a system which valued community and relationship more, we
might conclude that private insurance itself, which by defmition ex
tends coverage to only some members of a community, is anathema.
Similarly, we might conclude that the tort-insurance system is not the
best way to compensate for or deter interspousal injuries.
But we currently live in a world where private liability insurance
has much to do with what claims get brought and who gets compen
sated for their injuries. Liability insurance is based on probabilistic
behavior predictions that people are less likely to collude with those
outside the private realm of their families than with those inside the
family realm. 36 This prediction and assumption of insurance is some
what similar to the notion of atomistic self-interested individuals that
is said to be at the heart of liberalism.37 If we simultaneously continue
to rely on private insurance to deal with compensation and deterrence
of torts, yet truly reject the model of self-interested individuals/18 we
put in place a model that may justify the family member exclusion.
The reason this is so is that if we assume that individuals value rela
tionships and community above other values, we may also assume that
individuals will be more likely to collude with family members (people
with whom they have relationships, people with whom they form a
community) than with others. Thus, we may have created a justifica:
tion for the assumption made by insurers that this is so.
32. WEST, supra note 22, at 4-7, 124.
33. Becker, supra note 1, at 47.
34. See generally, CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. ScHN£.lDER, BATTERED WoMEN
AND TH£ l...Aw (2001).
35. SN McClain, supra note 26.
36. Of course, this assumption reproduces the family-market dichotomy fre
quently questioned by feminist scholars. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, TM Family and the
Market : A Study in lfkolbgy and Legal &form, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
37. W EST, supra note 22, at 4-7.
38. If we are relying on private insurance to encourage tort litigation, compensa
tion, and deterrence.
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Relational feminists probably would have responses to this, as fol
lows: even if it is true, as indeed it may be, that family members are
more likely to collud~ with one another than with others/~ 9 that does
not justify the wholesale exclusion. The wholesale exclusion is unac
ceptable given the harm that the exclusion does to women. Cl~s
investigation and rate-setting should be able to deal with the collusion
concern. The increased valuation of community and relationship is
precisely what makes the family member exclusion unacceptable. Val
uing relationships means that we recognize the potential for both
harm and good in relationships,40 and that when there is harm, we
find ways Lo heal it and compensate for it. Once intentional torts take
place in relationships and family communities, liability insuranc~
should be there to help with compensation and deterrence. 41 Moreo
ver, valuing community and relationship means that more loss-sharing
should take place through the mechanism of insurance than currently
takes place. All policyholders should, as part of valuing community
and relationship, help compensate {through insurance premiums)
those injured by intentional torts of family members. In this way, the
state would take injuries to women more seriously and begin to
counter, rather than legitimate, these injuries.42
IV.

CoNCLUSION

A broad focus on "the relational" in torts and insurance law leads
us to focus on hitherto unexamined assumptions and their conse
quences, such as the assumption underlying interspousal tort immu
nity and insurance exclusions that family members will collude to
create false claims (and that nonfamily members will not do so) . If it
tums out that these assumptions are empirically verifiable, liberal fem
inism's critique of them is seriously weakened. 43 Relational feminism,
on the other hand, with its focus on values and human flourishing,
preserves a critique of inequality even in the face of empirical differ
ences. As Becker notes, however, it has a ''weakness" of being "not
judicially manageable. "44 This is a significant weakness for a legal the
ory. However, relational feminism is making significant contributions
in widening the lens of feminist legal theory.

39. Relational feminism would seem to have an easier time than liberal feminism
acknowledging that this might be true.
40. W EST, supra note 22, at 7.
41 . See Saks, supra note 13.
42. See WEST, supra note 22, at 136, 142, 165.
43. As ma ny have noted, liberal feminism requires that likes be treated alike but
does not go further.
44. Becker, supra note 1, at 47.

